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I. I. Metacognition Metacognition and and Conscious Awareness Conscious Awareness
Metacognition Metacognition is the cognitive registration is the cognitive registration of one's cognitive processes and states of one's cognitive processes and states of one's cognitive processes and states. of one's cognitive processes and states. Classic examples include the sense we Classic examples include the sense we sometimes have that we know or that we sometimes have that we know or that we will recall something, and the sense that will recall something, and the sense that we have a word on the tip of our tongue we have a word on the tip of our tongue--though many other cases of higher though many other cases of higher--order order g y g g y g cognition are also called cognition are also called metacognition metacognition. . A family of theories of consciousness hold A family of theories of consciousness hold that a state's being conscious consists in that a state's being conscious consists in one's being aware of that state. one's being aware of that state. Should that too count as Should that too count as metacognition metacognition? ? Not everybody endorses such higher Not everybody endorses such higher--order order (HO) (HO) theories of consciousness; so theories of consciousness; so--called called first first--order order (FO) (FO) theorists (e.g., Ned Block) theorists (e.g., Ned Block) deny that a state's being conscious involves deny that a state's being conscious involves any such higher any such higher--order awareness order awareness (HOA) (HOA). . HO HO theorists rely on the commonsense theorists rely on the commonsense HO HO theorists rely on the commonsense theorists rely on the commonsense observation that a state of which one is observation that a state of which one is wholly unaware is not conscious wholly unaware is not conscious--a test a test also widely used also widely used in experimental work.
in experimental work. So a state is conscious only if one is in some So a state is conscious only if one is in some way aware of it way aware of it--only if one has a only if one has a HOA HOA. . y y y y This provides a natural explanation of how This provides a natural explanation of how conscious states differ psychologically from conscious states differ psychologically from mental states that are not conscious. mental states that are not conscious. A FO theory, which denies appeal to a A FO theory, which denies appeal to a HOA HOA, , is unlikely to be able to do that. is unlikely to be able to do that.
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Some Some FO FO theories rely on a neural marker theories rely on a neural marker of a state's being conscious of a state's being conscious (e.g., (e.g., Lamme Lamme 2010) 2010). . But that won't help unless we can already But that won't help unless we can already distinguish conscious from distinguish conscious from nonconscious nonconscious mental states, and so show it's that neural mental states, and so show it's that neural marker that marker that subserves subserves the conscious cases the conscious cases marker that marker that subserves subserves the conscious cases.
the conscious cases. Other theorists say simply that we know Other theorists say simply that we know from the inside from the inside--from a first from a first--person point person point of view of view--what conscious states are.
what conscious states are. But that either is uninformative or reduces But that either is uninformative or reduces to having a to having a HOA HOA of the conscious cases.
of the conscious cases. g g Some Some FO FO theorists say that conscious states theorists say that conscious states are those that involve attention, but much are those that involve attention, but much recent work shows a double dissociation recent work shows a double dissociation between consciousness and attention between consciousness and attention (Koch Dretske Dretske has urged that a state's being has urged that a state's being conscious consists not in one's being aware conscious consists not in one's being aware of that state, but in the state's making one of that state, but in the state's making one aware of something. But subliminal states aware of something. But subliminal states do make one aware of stimuli do make one aware of stimuli--though not consciously aware of them though not consciously aware of them though not consciously aware of them. though not consciously aware of them. A popular type of A popular type of FO FO theory appeals to a theory appeals to a global workspace global workspace (GW) As a first pass, note that in As a first pass, note that in TOT TOT one has one has a sense that one will be able to recall the a sense that one will be able to recall the information, though one can't right now. information, though one can't right now. Similarly with so Similarly with so--called feeling called feeling--of of--knowing knowing judgments judgments (Nelson & (Nelson & Narens Narens 1994 ) 1994 One has a thought that Orwell's real name One has a thought that Orwell's real name is 'Blair'. That thought is not conscious as is 'Blair'. That thought is not conscious as described in that way: One is unaware of described in that way: One is unaware of having the thought that his name is 'Blair'. having the thought that his name is 'Blair'. But one is aware of having a thought that But one is aware of having a thought that provides his real name; described in that provides his real name; described in that provides his real name; described in that provides his real name; described in that way, the thought is conscious. way, the thought is conscious. This is an important phenomenon, which This is an important phenomenon, which I'll come back to. States can be conscious I'll come back to. States can be conscious in respect of some mental properties but in respect of some mental properties but not others. Often this goes unnoticed; we not others. Often this goes unnoticed; we g ; g ; may be aware of sensing red, but not may be aware of sensing red, but not at all at all aware of sensing a specific shade of red. aware of sensing a specific shade of red. TOT is a dramatic example TOT is a dramatic example--in which this in which this kind of disparity is not only noticed, but kind of disparity is not only noticed, but leads to a dissonant, uncomfortable feeling. leads to a dissonant, uncomfortable feeling. 1984 , 1986 1984 , 1986 Merikle Merikle 1992 ) 1992 . . Appeal to explicit confidence ratings has Appeal to explicit confidence ratings has been refined by having subjects place bets been refined by having subjects place bets on a perceptual decision on a perceptual decision ( (Persaud Persaud et al et al 2007) High confidence and willingness to wager High confidence and willingness to wager might be due to many factors. might be due to many factors. Still, they typically coincide with subjective Still, they typically coincide with subjective reports reports ( (Persaud Persaud et al et al 2007; 2007; Dienes Dienes & Seth 2010) & Seth 2010)--presumably because lack of conscious presumably because lack of conscious awareness results in low confidence and awareness results in low confidence and awareness results in low confidence and awareness results in low confidence and hence a reluctance to wager. hence a reluctance to wager. Confidence and wagering likely vary even Confidence and wagering likely vary even with the different respects in which one's with the different respects in which one's perceptions can be conscious. perceptions can be conscious. E.g., in E.g., in Sperling's Sperling's partial partial--report report E.g., in E.g., in Sperling s Sperling s partial partial report report paradigm, subjects are paradigm, subjects are briefly briefly presented with a 3 x 4 matrix of presented with a 3 x 4 matrix of letters. Without subsequent cuing, subjects letters. Without subsequent cuing, subjects are consciously aware of all 12 as letters are consciously aware of all 12 as letters--but can identify only about 3 but can identify only about 3--4 of them.
4 of them. But subjects can also identify 3 But subjects can also identify 3--4 letters 4 letters in any of the three rows in any of the three rows--if cued for that if cued for that row even after the display has vanished. row even after the display has vanished. In both cases they identify only 3 In both cases they identify only 3--4 letters. 4 letters. But since they can do so for any cued row But since they can do so for any cued row, , the the FO FO information must be there for all 12 information must be there for all 12 the the FO FO information must be there for all 12.
information must be there for all 12. So the limit is in subjects' So the limit is in subjects' HOAs HOAs--which which represent their perception represent their perception as being of 12 as being of 12 letters, but represent specific identities letters, but represent specific identities only for 3 only for 3--4 of the characters.
4 of the characters. My hunch is that subjects would also e My hunch is that subjects would also e My hunch is that subjects would also e My hunch is that subjects would also e confident and would confident and would bet that they're all bet that they're all letters letters--but about specific identities only but about specific identities only for 3 for 3--4. Confidence and 4. Confidence and betting would betting would coincide with the coincide with the specific respects specific respects in which in which one is aware of perceiving the characters one is aware of perceiving the characters. . Subjects' awareness of all the letters just Subjects' awareness of all the letters just as letters might generate confidence that as letters might generate confidence that they could identify all the letters; generic they could identify all the letters; generic identifying often goes with being able to identifying often goes with being able to identify it specifically. identify it specifically. So they might So they might feel sure feel sure pre pre--cue that cue that So they might So they might feel sure feel sure pre pre--cue that cue that they could identify they could identify all all. This might explain . This might explain why some why some Sperling Sperling subjects say that they subjects say that they consciously saw consciously saw more than they can more than they can remember remember ( (Sperling Sperling 1983 ) 1983 ). . But confidence about identifying them all But confidence about identifying them all h l i h i kl i h f h l i h i kl i h f the letters might quickly vanish after the letters might quickly vanish after several trials in which subjects learned several trials in which subjects learned that they successfully identified only 3 that they successfully identified only 3--4. 4. It's worth testing whether confidence and It's worth testing whether confidence and wagering does vary in these ways. wagering does vary in these ways. One sometimes judges erroneously that One sometimes judges erroneously that one will recall something or that one has one will recall something or that one has information one cannot now retrieve. information one cannot now retrieve. And And metacognition metacognition may seem in this way may seem in this way to differ from our subjective awareness of to differ from our subjective awareness of to differ from our subjective awareness of to differ from our subjective awareness of our conscious states. Consciousness, one our conscious states. Consciousness, one may think, cannot misrepresent mental may think, cannot misrepresent mental states. If it seems subjectively that I feel states. If it seems subjectively that I feel or see something, perhaps these subjective or see something, perhaps these subjective appearances simply cannot be mistaken. appearances simply cannot be mistaken. The dominant view, traditionally and even The dominant view, traditionally and even today, is that consciousness cannot fail to today, is that consciousness cannot fail to represent our mental lives accurately. represent our mental lives accurately. Indeed, this is often advanced Indeed, this is often advanced ( (Neander Neander 1998 , 1998 But we should also look more closely at the But we should also look more closely at the claim that consciousness can't subjectively claim that consciousness can't subjectively misrepresent the mental states we're in. misrepresent the mental states we're in. On reflection, this view is quite surprising. On reflection, this view is quite surprising. Consciousness is the way our mental lives Consciousness is the way our mental lives appear to us and appearances don't always appear to us and appearances don't always appear to us, and appearances don t always appear to us, and appearances don t always match the way things actually are. Why, match the way things actually are. Why, then, shouldn't our subjective appearances then, shouldn't our subjective appearances about our mental lives sometimes do so? about our mental lives sometimes do so? And if they do, consciousness won't after And if they do, consciousness won't after all differ in this way from all differ in this way from metacognition metacognition. . y y g g No reason is ever given for the claim that No reason is ever given for the claim that consciousness cannot misrepresent our consciousness cannot misrepresent our mental lives; it's supposed just to be mental lives; it's supposed just to be obvious. So it's worth asking why this obvious. So it's worth asking why this traditional view is so deeply entrenched. traditional view is so deeply entrenched. We can readily check whether appearances We can readily check whether appearances are are accurate when accurate when nonmental nonmental reality is at reality is at issue. But it may seem that we can't test issue. But it may seem that we can't test whether subjective awareness represents whether subjective awareness represents our mental lives accurately. our mental lives accurately. Subjective access is often seen as the gold Subjective access is often seen as the gold Subjective access is often seen as the gold Subjective access is often seen as the gold standard standard--the only standard the only standard--about mental about mental reality, with no way to correct itself. reality, with no way to correct itself. But subjective access isn't always accurate But subjective access isn't always accurate if some mental states occur if some mental states occur nonconsciously nonconsciously, , since subjectivity fails to reveal them. since subjectivity fails to reveal them. j y j y So we must balance first So we must balance first--and third and third--person person considerations about mental functioning, considerations about mental functioning, taking both into consideration, permitting taking both into consideration, permitting neither to be the last word. neither to be the last word. Third Third--person person access often trumps subjectivity. access often trumps subjectivity. saccades. 18% of subjects subjects were unaware of a salient change from were unaware of a salient change from red to green. So when the stimulus was red to green. So when the stimulus was green, they were green, they were aware of a perception of aware of a perception of green as if it were a perception of red green as if it were a perception of red. . (1977) (1977) found that though subjects found that though subjects preferred identical fabrics placed to the preferred identical fabrics placed to the right, they right, they denied that position effect and denied that position effect and confabulated confabulated reasons for their preference reasons for their preference confabulated confabulated reasons for their preference.
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reasons for their preference. In these cases, subjects were subjectively In these cases, subjects were subjectively aware of themselves as actually having aware of themselves as actually having the confabulated reasons. Though it's no surprise that Though it's no surprise that metacognition metacognition can can--and sometimes does and sometimes does--misrepresent, misrepresent, a strong intuitive a strong intuitive sense may persist that sense may persist that consciousness simply cannot consciousness simply cannot do so. do so. That goes with an equally robust subjective That goes with an equally robust subjective th t th t f t t ' b i th t th t f t t ' b i sense that the property of a state's being sense that the property of a state's being conscious is inseparable from the state conscious is inseparable from the state and its other mental properties. These and its other mental properties. These appearances seem to favor a appearances seem to favor a FO FO theory theory--though not a though not a GW GW theory, on which being theory, on which being conscious is distinct from the state. conscious is distinct from the state. How can these compelling intuitions How can these compelling intuitions square with a square with a HO HO or or GW GW theory, on which theory, on which misrepresentation can and presumably misrepresentation can and presumably does occur, and a state's being conscious does occur, and a state's being conscious is distinct from that state? is distinct from that state? Any acceptable theory must do Any acceptable theory must do justice to justice to the subjective appearances the subjective appearances. . But it need But it need not do so by taking the appearances not do so by taking the appearances to to be veridical. It can do so instead by be veridical. It can do so instead by explaining explaining why it is that we have the why it is that we have the subjective appearances in question subjective appearances in question subjective appearances in question subjective appearances in question. . We We must must in any case explain that. And the in any case explain that. And the appearances' being veridical wouldn't help appearances' being veridical wouldn't help at all at all--except on the dubious assumption except on the dubious assumption that the mind is transparent to itself. that the mind is transparent to itself. And we can explain why subjectivity seems And we can explain why subjectivity seems d e ca e p a y subjec y see s d e ca e p a y subjec y see s always accurate. We're rarely aware of the always accurate. We're rarely aware of the HOA HOA; so it seems subjectively that there's ; so it seems subjectively that there's only one state. So being conscious seems only one state. So being conscious seems inseparable from the state, leaving no inseparable from the state, leaving no room for misrepresentation. room for misrepresentation. Another criticism of Another criticism of HO HO theories is that theories is that they might allow one to be subjectively they might allow one to be subjectively aware of any mental state one might wish aware of any mental state one might wish ( (Balog Balog 2000 ) 2000 . That seems especially so for . That seems especially so for my view, on which the HOA is a thought my view, on which the HOA is a thought--a state with intentional content and an a state with intentional content and an a state with intentional content and an a state with intentional content and an assertoric assertoric mental attitude. Can't one, mental attitude. Can't one, after all, think whatever one wishes? after all, think whatever one wishes? No. One can't produce subjectively No. One can't produce subjectively unmediated unmediated HOA HOAs at will; we can't simply s at will; we can't simply think think assertorically assertorically whatever one pleases. whatever one pleases. As misrepresentation, consciousness again, As misrepresentation, consciousness again, and again and again perhaps surprisingly, resembles perhaps surprisingly, resembles metacognition metacognition. . Metacognitive Metacognitive access access to one's cognitive states is also not in to one's cognitive states is also not in standard cases within one's control. standard cases within one's control. III. Utility III. Utility I've contested the prevailing view that, I've contested the prevailing view that, whereas whereas metacognition metacognition can misrepresent can misrepresent our cognitions subjective consciousness our cognitions subjective consciousness our cognitions, subjective consciousness our cognitions, subjective consciousness cannot misrepresent our mental lives. cannot misrepresent our mental lives. Let me turn now to another comparison of Let me turn now to another comparison of consciousness with consciousness with metacognition metacognition, , again taking issue with the dominant view. again taking issue with the dominant view. Metacognition Metacognition plainly has substantial utility plainly has substantial utility Metacognition Metacognition plainly has substantial utility plainly has substantial utility for psychological functioning, and it's for psychological functioning, and it's typically held that consciousness does as typically held that consciousness does as well. I'll argue that consciousness actually well. I'll argue that consciousness actually has little utility and that has little utility and that--surprisingly surprisingly--it's it's in this way unlike in this way unlike metacognition metacognition. . It's useful to have a sense of how much It's useful to have a sense of how much one knows or will recall; so one knows or will recall; so metacognition metacognition can have very substantial utility. But such can have very substantial utility. But such metacognitive metacognitive judgments don't result in judgments don't result in states' being conscious; so states' being conscious; so metacognitive metacognitive utility needn't carry over to consciousness utility needn't carry over to consciousness utility needn t carry over to consciousness. utility needn t carry over to consciousness. Still, it's tempting to think consciousness Still, it's tempting to think consciousness has utility because we often understand has utility because we often understand phenomena by appeal to their utility. phenomena by appeal to their utility. But not always; we also often understand But not always; we also often understand them by appeal to what causes them. them by appeal to what causes them. y pp y pp We're subjectively aware of a state's utility We're subjectively aware of a state's utility when the state is conscious, but that utility when the state is conscious, but that utility needn't needn't depend depend on its being conscious. on its being conscious. Indeed, consciousness is blind to whatever Indeed, consciousness is blind to whatever utility utility nonconscious nonconscious states might have. states might have. Finally it's crucial to distinguish a state's Finally it's crucial to distinguish a state's being conscious from a creature's being being conscious from a creature's being conscious or its being conscious of things. conscious or its being conscious of things. The obvious utility of the last two doesn't The obvious utility of the last two doesn't imply utility for the first, since each can imply utility for the first, since each can occur independently of the others occur independently of the others occur independently of the others. occur independently of the others. All that aside, there are two main reasons All that aside, there are two main reasons states think a state's being conscious has states think a state's being conscious has utility: rationality and social interaction. utility: rationality and social interaction. Rationality is a matter of whether the states' Rationality is a matter of whether the states' representational contents fit together representational contents fit together representational contents fit together representational contents fit together rationally. So the challenge for thinking rationally. So the challenge for thinking that utility derives from rationality is to that utility derives from rationality is to show that the rational ties don't result show that the rational ties don't result simply from causal ties among the states, simply from causal ties among the states, independent of the states' being conscious. independent of the states' being conscious. And experimental results show states have And experimental results show states have a rational effect before becoming conscious a rational effect before becoming conscious ( (Libet Libet 1985 , Haggard 1999 ) 1985 , Haggard 1999 and that and that nonconscious nonconscious planning can be better than conscious planning can be better than conscious planning planning ( ( (Weiskrantz Weiskrantz 1997 ) 1997 . But it may be hard to tell that this is . But it may be hard to tell that this is due to the states' not being conscious, as due to the states' not being conscious, as against other deficits in these conditions. against other deficits in these conditions. Larry Jacoby's Larry Jacoby's (1991; (1991; Debner Debner and Jacoby 1994; and Jacoby 1994; Jacoby Jacoby et al et al 1993 , 1994 1993, 1994) exclusion task is exclusion task is sometimes held to support a tie between sometimes held to support a tie between consciousness and intentional action. consciousness and intentional action. This would constitute a kind of utility for This would constitute a kind of utility for consciousness that's related to rationality consciousness that's related to rationality consciousness that s related to rationality. consciousness that s related to rationality. Subjects are visually presented with a Subjects are visually presented with a word, say, 'reason', and asked to complete word, say, 'reason', and asked to complete a word stem, say ' a word stem, say 'rea rea--', with any word ', with any word other than other than the presented word.
the presented word. When a word is presented for 500 ms, When a word is presented for 500 ms, e a o d s p ese ed o 500 s, e a o d s p ese ed o 500 s, subjects see it consciously and mainly subjects see it consciously and mainly succeed in following the instruction; when succeed in following the instruction; when it's presented for only 50 ms, they report it's presented for only 50 ms, they report seeing no word seeing no word--but tend to complete the but tend to complete the stem with the word that was presented. stem with the word that was presented. Subjects are instructed Subjects are instructed not not to complete to complete j j p p the stem with a word they see. the stem with a word they see. But when they're aware only of seeing a But when they're aware only of seeing a blank blank screen screen (which has greater neural signal (which has greater neural signal strength strength than the than the nonconscious nonconscious sensation of the sensation of the word) word), they're not , they're not aware of aware of seeing the seeing the word word--so so they think they don't see it they think they don't see it. . y y y y
It's not that consciousness is needed for It's not that consciousness is needed for intentional action. Rather, subjects intentional action. Rather, subjects following the instructions in the 50 following the instructions in the 50--ms ms case case think they don't see the word think they don't see the word (though it still primes their response).
(though it still primes their response). One might contest that; aren't all verbally One might contest that; aren't all verbally expressed thoughts conscious? expressed thoughts conscious? Yes; but not because their being conscious Yes; but not because their being conscious is needed to express them verbally. is needed to express them verbally. When one says it's raining, one is equally When one says it's raining, one is equally di d t th t thi k it' i i di d t th t thi k it' i i disposed to say that one thinks it's raining. disposed to say that one thinks it's raining. Indeed, one may not recall which one Indeed, one may not recall which one said, even a moment earlier. said, even a moment earlier. So when one says it's raining, one's being So when one says it's raining, one's being also disposed to say that one thinks it's also disposed to say that one thinks it's raining reflects one's having a HOT that raining reflects one's having a HOT that a g e ec s o e s a g a O a a g e ec s o e s a g a O a one thinks it's raining. Verbally expressed one thinks it's raining. Verbally expressed thoughts are always conscious not because thoughts are always conscious not because consciousness consciousness is needed, but because of is needed, but because of the automatic use equivalence of saying the automatic use equivalence of saying something and saying that one thinks it. something and saying that one thinks it. 
